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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court decided mat-
ters relating to both the admission and reinstatement of attorneys
to the Illinois Bar and the discipline of Illinois Bar members.,
Also during this period, Illinois appellate courts decided privately
initiated attorney malpractice actions.2 The Illinois Supreme
Court disposed of most disciplinary proceedings by court order,
and without a written opinion. Analyses of the opinions issued, as
* Of Counsel, Phelan, Pope & John, Chicago, Illinois; A.B., 1970, St. John's Univer-
sity; J.D., 1973, University of Notre Dame.
** B.A., 1986, University of Michigan; JD. candidate, 1989, Loyola University of
Chicago.
1. The Survey year covers the period July 1, 1986 through July 1, 1987. Some of the
matters decided by the courts during the Survey year, however, were initiated by the
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission prior to July 1, 1986.
2. Procedurally, matters involving attorney misconduct may reach the court through
two separate mechanisms: the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (the
"ARDC"), and privately initiated malpractice actions. Although the Illinois Supreme
Court may hear both types of cases, it is the only court that hears ARDC related cases.
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well as the appellate court opinions issued in attorney malpractice
actions, however, should apprise the practitioner of the profes-
sional ethical guidelines that members of the Illinois Bar are ex-
pected to observe. Moreover, these opinions will familiarize the
practitioner with the proceedings by which ethical issues are
brought to the attention of the courts.
II. THE ROLES OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY
COMMISSION
The Illinois Supreme Court regulates the admission of attorneys
to the bar and ultimately imposes attorney discipline for infrac-
tions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.3 During the Sur-
vey year, an Illinois appellate court decided a case in which both
the role and nature of the disciplinary process was restated in
detail.4
In People ex rel Brazen v. Finley, the plaintiff filed a complaint
challenging the validity of Circuit Court Rule 0.7, arguing that the
circuit court was without authority to promote such a rule.5 Fol-
lowing a hearing, and pursuant to the defendant's motion, the trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, reasoning that Rule 0.7 re-
lated to administrative court procedures and was, therefore,
neither illegal nor unconstitutional.6
On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's decision.7 In
reaching its conclusion, the appellate court reasoned that Rule 0.7
overlapped with Supreme Court Rules 2-103 and 5-103 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and, therefore, represented an im-
proper intrusion on the forum created by the Illinois Supreme
Court.' The court noted that "[the] supreme court in its rules has
3. For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of these procedures, see Sukowicz &
Thompson, Professional Responsibility, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
715, 716 (1986).
4. People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 146 Ill. App. 3d 750, 497 N.E.2d 1013 (1st Dist.
1986). Although Finley was not a disciplinary or attorney malpractice cause of action, it
provides a useful discussion of the supreme court rules that regulate the conduct of mem-
bers of the Illinois Bar.
5. Id. at 751, 497 N.E.2d at 1014. Circuit Court Rule 0.7 requires attorneys repre-
senting clients in personal injury and domestic relations cases to submit an affidavit of
compliance describing the factual circumstances surrounding their employment. Id.
6. Id. at 752, 497 N.E.2d at 1015.
7. Id. at 755, 497 N.E.2d at 1017.
8. Id. at 754, 497 N.E.2d at 1016. Supreme Court Rules 2-103 and 5-103 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility bar attorneys from private communications soliciting em-
ployment and from providing financial assistance to clients. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
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already established a comprehensive regulatory scheme for investi-
gating and disciplining attorneys who may have violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility."9 Further, the court restated that
the area of attorney discipline is under the exclusive regulation of
the Illinois Supreme Court.' 0 Specifically, "the disciplining of at-
torneys is in the nature of an original proceeding in which the At-
torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ... serve as
agents of the supreme court in administering the disciplinary func-
tions that have been delegated to them."' I In light of the Illinois
Supreme Court's exclusive role in the regulation of attorney disci-
pline, the appellate court found Rule 0.7 beyond the circuit court's
power and authority for the purposes of the relief sought.' 2
III. THE ARDC ANNUAL REPORT
In addition to its duties of administrative supervision of attorney
registration and disciplinary proceedings, the ARDC is responsible
for submitting an annual report to the Illinois Supreme Court, the
Illinois Bar members, and the public. The report is a statement of
the activities of the ARDC for the relevant calendar year. The
most recent ARDC report submitted to the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois on April 30, 1987, shows the 1986 disciplinary caseload at an
all time high.' 3 In 1986, 4,535 investigations were initiated by the.
administrator, compared with 3,935 administrator-initiated com-
plaints in 1985.14 Since 1976, this figure has increased one hundred
and seventy-five percent.'5 The 1986 report also classified charges
of misconduct received by the administrator according to the spe-
cific types of violation alleged and the area of law in which the
RESPONSIBILITY Rules 2-103 and 5-103, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A CANONS 2, 5 (1985
and Supp. 1987).
9. Finley, 146 Il. App. 3d at 754, 497 N.E.2d at 1016.
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing Shnack v. Crumley, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1007, 431 N.E.2d 1364,
1369 (1982)).
12. Id.
13. 1986 ARDC ANN. REP. at 4 (1987).
14. Id. Of the 4,535 investigations in 1986, 3,373 complaints came from individuals,
and 1,162 were initiated by the administrator. Id. at 5. Three hundred and seventeen of
the charges investigated by the administrator during the 1986 calendar year were Grey-
lord related. Id.
15. Id. at 6. In 1977, there were a reported 1,650 investigations, compared with
4,535 investigations in 1986. Id. During the same ten year period, the number of regis-
tered attorneys increased 54%. Id. There were 31,936 registered attorneys in Illinois in
1977, compared with 49,177 attorneys in 1986. Id. Further, the 1986 figures indicate a
general increase in the number of complaints voted by the inquiry board, as well as cases
ultimately filed with the hearing board, the review board, and the supreme court. Id.
1988]
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misconduct allegedly occurred. 16 The most frequently alleged vio-
lations include neglect (922 cases), failure to communicate with a
client (655 cases), conduct involving dishonesty or fraud (378
cases), and conduct involving improper handling of funds (403
cases). 7  The most common areas of law involved at the time of
the alleged attorney misconduct were torts, criminal law, domestic
relations, and real estate, including landlord and tenant law.' 8
Finally, the 1986 report noted changes and amendments in the
Supreme Court Rules, the Commission Rules, and the Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct.' 9 Supreme Court Rule 756, which governs attor-
ney registration, was amended to provide for an increase in
registration fees.20 Additionally, Rule 773(b), which governs the
financial duties of the attorney respondent in disciplinary proceed-
ings, was amended to clarify the situations in which the attorney is
required to reimburse the Commission for the costs of his discipli-
nary proceedings.2' The revised rules of the Illinois Supreme
Court and the Commission are published by the ARDC, and are
available upon request.
IV. THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
The majority of cases decided during the Survey year involved
attorney discipline imposed after a finding of misconduct. All dis-
ciplinary cases reached the court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
753.22
16. Id. at 10.
17. Id.
18. Id. The four most common types of misconduct and five most common types of
subject matter accounted for over 50% of the total charges in 1986 and have been among
the most common in every ARDC report including this analysis. Id.; 1985 ARDC ANN.
REP. 4 (1986); 1984 ARDC ANN. REP. 12 (1985); 1983 ARDC ANN. REP. 6 (1984);
1982 ARDC ANN. REP. 3 (1983); 1981 ARDC ANN. REP. 5 (1982); 1980 ARDC ANN.
REP. 5 (1981).
19. 1986 ARDC ANN. REP. at 8. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted a new Code of
Judicial Conduct effective January 1, 1987. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, paras. 61-71
(Supp. 1987) (adopted Dec. 2, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987).
20. ILL. S. CT. R. 756, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 756 (Supp. 1986).
21. ILL. S. CT. R. 773(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 773 (b)(1986). When the
review of matters brought before the ARDC pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 753, 754,
761, 762, and 763 result in the imposition of discipline, it is the duty of the attorney
respondent to reimburse the Commission for costs incurred in the investigation. Id.
22. ILL. S. CT. R. 753, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 753 (1985). The disciplinary
process begins under Supreme Court Rule 753 with an investigation by the Inquiry
Board. The Inquiry Board then votes to close the investigation, to dismiss the charge, or
to file a complaint. When the Inquiry Board votes to file a complaint, the complaint is
prepared by the Administrator and filed with the Hearing Board. Both the Respondent
and the Administrator may file exceptions, as a matter of right, to a Hearing Board's
Professional Responsibility
A. Mishandling of Client Funds
During the Survey year, two opinions concerned the mishan-
dling of client funds. 23 Both cases involved the violation of Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.24 In each case, the
court suspended the respondents from the practice of law. The
suspensions imposed were for a period of three months in one
252case, and three years in the other.26
In In re Cheronis, the court imposed a three-month suspension
for the mishandling of client funds. Specifically, the court deter-
mined that the respondent had commingled and converted client
funds, thereby jeopardizing his client's ability to recover money
rightfully belonging to the client.27 The court held that such con-
duct, even absent a dishonest motive, warranted suspension. 28
The respondent's specific offense involved depositing a client's
bond refund check into his combined business and personal bank
account.29 This account was not a client escrow or trust account
required by Rule 9-102(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, and was used by the respondent to pay both personal and busi-
ness expenses.30 The account was overdrawn within three weeks of
report. If exceptions are filed, the Hearing Board's report is then evaluated by the Re-
view Board. If the Review Board determines that disciplinary action is required, the
Review Board's report is filed with the Illinois Supreme Court. The respondent may file
exceptions to this report as a matter of right. The Administrator may petition the court
for leave to file exceptions. The court then determines what discipline, if any, is appropri-
ate. Id. For a detailed discussion of the disciplinary process under Rule 753, see
Sukowicz & Thompson, supra note 3, at 720.
23. In re Cheronis, 114 Ill. 2d 527, 502 N.E.2d 722 (1986); In re Elias, 114 11. 2d
321, 499 N.E.2d 1327 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1351 (1987).
24. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1 10A, CANON 9 (1985), amended by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, CANON 9 (Supp. 1987)
(effective August 1, 1987). Rule 9-102 deals with the specific duty imposed upon attor-
neys to preserve the identity of client property and funds. Id.
25. Cheronis, 114 Ill. 2d at 537, 502 N.E.2d at 727.
26. Elias, 114 Ill. 2d 340, 499 N.E.2d 1335.
27. Cheronis, 114 I1. 2d at 536, 502 N.E.2d at 726.
28. Id. The court restated that commingling or conversion of client funds are
grounds for suspension or, absent mitigating factors, disbarment. Id. at 535, 502 N.E.2d
at 726.
29. Id. at 530, 502 N.E.2d at 723. Under Rule 9-102 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, attorneys are under a strict duty to maintain and preserve the identity of
client funds and property. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, CANON 9 (1985), amended by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, Canon 9
(Supp. 1987)(effective August 1, 1987). Rule 9-102(a) specifically provides that "[a]ll
funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including funds belonging in part to a client
and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm, shall be deposited in one or
more separate identifiable trust accounts." Id.
30. Cheronis, 114 Il1. 2d at 530, 534, 502 N.E.2d at 723, 725.
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depositing the bond refund check .3  Between the time the check
was deposited and the final payment to the client, the respondent's
account was overdrawn approximately nineteen times.32
The respondent testified before the Hearing Board that he was
unaware of the Code of Professional Responsibility requirement to
maintain segregated client fund accounts.33 The Hearing Board
recommended censure.34 The Review Board, however, recom-
mended a six-month suspension .3  The Illinois Supreme Court up-
held the Review Board's recommendation.36 The court, however,
imposed a lesser suspension of three months.3 The court's deci-
sion was based, in part, on a series of mitigating factors that
weighed heavily in the respondent's behalf.3 Additionally, the
court emphasized that the client who filed the complaint against
the respondent retained him for three additional legal matters. 9
Moreover, the client referred others to the respondent for legal rep-
resentation and assistance. 4° Despite the mitigating factors, the
court held that discipline was nonetheless warranted4 and sus-
pended the respondent for a period of three months.42
In re Elias also involved the suspension of an attorney for com-
mingling and converting client funds. 3 As in In re Cheronis, the
respondent was found to have mismanaged client funds in violation
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility." The re-
spondent's conduct, however, was also found to be dishonest and
fraudulent, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 1-102(a)(4).45 In
31. Id. at 530, 502 N.E.2d at 723.
32. Id. at 532, 502 N.E.2d at 724.
33. Id. at 533, 502 N.E.2d at 724.
34. Id. at 534, 502 N.E.2d at 725.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 537, 502 N.E.2d at 727.
37. Id.
38. Id. The following mitigating factors were considered in determining the proper
sanction: the lack of dishonest motive, respondent's full cooperation with the Administra-
tor and Hearing Board, respondent's full restitution to the client, respondent's active role
in pro bono work, respondent's remorse, respondent's prompt action in opening a client
trust account, and respondent's good reputation in the community. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 535, 502 N.E.2d at 726.
42. Id. at 537, 502 N.E.2d at 727.
43. Elias, 114 11. 2d at 325, 499 N.E.2d at 1328.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 339, 499 N.E.2d at 1334. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Rule 1-102(a)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 1OA CANON 1 (1985). Specifically, Rule I-
102(a)(4) provides that an attorney shall not "engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." Id.
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light of a pattern of similar behavior, the court imposed a three-
year suspension- 6
Respondent, a solo practitioner, was active in the area of per-
sonal injury. 7 To facilitate business, the respondent opened and
maintained six bank accounts, each under a different name.4 In
addition to personal use,49 the respondent used these accounts to
deposit checks in settlement of a client's personal injury claim.50
The respondent then issued a check to the client for the client's
share of the settlement.5 Though the client's check was drawn on
one of the respondent's six accounts, it was not necessarily drawn
on the account into which that client's settlement check was depos-
ited.5 2  On at least thirteen separate occasions, the respondent's
check was dishonored when presented for payment. 3
The Hearing Board found that the respondent violated Rule 9-
102(b), 54 and recommended reprimand and admonishment. 55 The
Review Board, however, found that the respondent violated Rule
9-102(a) and Rule 1-102(a)(4).5 6 Based on the record, the Review
Board recommended that the respondent be disbarred. 7
Although the court found the respondent's pattern and practice
of depositing and disbursing funds to be "premised on a basic de-
46. Elias, 114 Ill. 2d at 340, 499 N.E.2d at 1335.
47. Id. at 326, 499 N.E.2d at 1328,
48. Id. at 327, 499 N.E.2d at 1328.
49. Id. at 328, 499 N.E.2d at 329. The record reveals that respondent disbursed
funds from the six business accounts for the payment of gambling casinos in Nevada and
New Jersey in amounts ranging from $7,000 to $50,000. Additionally, respondent made
various disbursements to family members and withdrew cash for personal use. Id.
50. Id. at 327, 499 N.E.2d at 1328.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 327, 499 N.E.2d at 1328-29.
53. Id. at 327-28, 499 N.E.2d at 1329. On eight occasions, respondent's check was
dishonored because of insufficient funds. Id. at 327, 499 N.E.2d at 1329. Although the
record does not indicate the specific reason that the bank dishonored the additional five
checks, it does indicate that large sums of money were deposited into these accounts. Id.
at 327-28, 499 N.E.2d at 1329. For example, during 1984, the statements for one of these
accounts showed deposits for the year to be in excess of three million dollars. Id. at 328,
499 N.E.2d at 1328.
54. Id. at 329, 499 N.E.2d at 1329. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule
9-102(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, CANON 9 (1985), amended by ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
I 10A, CANON 9 (Supp. 1987)(effective August 1, 1987). CANON 9 provides, in part, that
the portion of funds deposited into separate and identifiable accounts belonging to the
lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn only after reasonable notice to the client of the
intent to withdraw.
55. Elias, 114 11. 2d at 329, 499 N.E.2d at 1329.
56. Id. at 329, 499 N.E.2d at 1329-30. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
57. Elias, 114 IlI. 2d at 330, 499 N.E.2d at 1329-30.
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ception,"' 8 they determined that disbarment was an inappropriate
sanction in light of the respondent's behavior.59 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that disbarment has been imposed pri-
marily in cases in which attorneys have permanently converted
their clients' funds through negotiation of settlement without con-
sent, or forgery of their clients' endorsements. 60 Although the re-
spondent consistently misrepresented to clients the availability of
their settlement proceeds each time he presented them with checks
drawn on accounts he knew or should have known might be over-
drawn, direct losses to clients were cured by the respondent upon
receipt of notification. 61 Accordingly, the court imposed a suspen-
sion from the practice of law for a period of three years, rather
than following the Review Board's recommendation of
disbarment.62
B. Misconduct Involving Fraud and Deceit
The Illinois Supreme Court generally has applied a broad defini-
tion of fraud when deciding attorney disciplinary actions. Four
opinions during the Survey year involved attorney fraud, dishon-
esty, deceit, and misrepresentation. 63 The disciplinary sanctions
imposed by the court in these cases ranged from censure" to
disbarment.65
In In re Levy, the respondent was censured for "knowingly nego-
tiating a check containing a false endorsement. ' 66 After conclud-
ing that the respondent was guilty, the Hearing Board determined
that reprimand was the proper sanction in light of the offense.67
The Review Board affirmed this finding, and the Administrator
filed an exception. 68 The supreme court concluded that the respon-
58. Id. at 337, 499 N.E.2d at 1333.
59. Id. at 339, 499 N.E.2d at 1334.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 339-40, 499 N.E.2d at 1334-35.
63. In re McAuliffe, 116 IIl. 2d 254, 506 N.E.2d 1300 (1987); In re Braner, 115 Il1. 2d
384, 504 N.E.2d 102 (1987); In re Levy, 115 Ill. 2d 395, 504 N.E.2d 107 (1987); In re
Houdek, 113 Ill. 2d 323, 497 N.E.2d 1169 (1986).
64. McAuliffe, 116 Ill. 2d at 263, 506 N.E.2d at 1304; Levy, 115 Il. 2d at 401, 504
N.E.2d at 109.
65. Braner, 115 Ill. 2d at 395, 504 N.E.2d at 106.
66. Levy, 115 Il1. 2d at 396, 504 N.E.2d at 107.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 396-97, 504 N.E.2d at 107. Although both the respondent and Administra-
tor have the right to file exceptions to the report of the Hearing Board at the Review
Board level, exceptions are a matter of right for the respondent only. ILL. S. CT. R.
753(e)(1),(5),(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I I0A, para. 753(e)(1),(5),(6) (1985). The Adminis-
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dent's conduct was imprudent and improper, but did not constitute
fraud. 69 Although the court acknowledged that acts of forgery
necessarily involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresenta-
tion, they determined that the respondent lacked the essential ele-
ment of intent.7 0 In light of this determination, and the fact that
the respondent's conduct did not cause any actual harm or loss, the
court concluded that suspension was unnecessary to safeguard the
public or to maintain the integrity of the legal profession. 7' Ac-
cordingly, the court imposed censure.72
In re McAulliffe also involved the imposition of censure when
the respondent was found to have acted in an imprudent, improper
and unprofessional manner. Specifically, the respondent was
charged with conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, misrep-
resentation, prejudice to the administration of justice, moral turpi-
tude, and false statements with the intent to obstruct an inquiry.74
These charges stemmed from the settlement with a former business
partner of a dispute over legal fees that the respondent claimed
were owed to him.75 In order to settle the dispute, the respondent
agreed to recant his prior sworn testimony before the ARDC.7 6
The Hearing Board recommended reprimand in light of the ex-
traordinary mitigating circumstances concerning the respondent's
mental and physical impairment at the time of the incident.77 The
trator must petition the court for leave to file exceptions to an order or report of the
Review Board. Id. If the Administrator is granted leave to file exceptions, the order or
report of the Review Board is filed with the court and the respondent is given twenty-one
days in which to respond. Id.
69. Levy, 115 Iil. 2d at 399, 504 N.E.2d at 108.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 400, 504 N.E.2d at 108-09.
72. Id. at 401, 504 N.E.2d at 109.
73. McAuliffe, 116 II1. 2d at 263, 506 N.E.2d at 1303-04.
74. Id. at 255, 506 N.E.2d at 1300.
75. Id. The respondent was a former judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County. Id.
at 256, 506 N.E.2d at 1301. After resigning from the bench in 1979, respondent went
into private practice with a personal injury attorney. Id. at 257, 506 N.E.2d at 1301. The
relationship ended after eight months when the respondent became associated with an-
other attorney. Id. After approximately one year, the respondent received notice from
the second attorney terminating their business relationship. Id. The attorney also in-
formed the respondent that he would not pay the respondent certain fees that the respon-
dent claimed were owed to him. Id.
76. Id. at 256, 506 N.E.2d at 1302. The respondent filed a complaint with the ARDC
in an effort to persuade the attorney to pay the amount the respondent claimed was owed
to him. Id. at 257, 506 N.E.2d at 1301. Specifically, the respondent claimed that the
attorney had used waiver-of-attorney-lien forms without the respondent's consent. Id.
The respondent provided the ARDC with a sworn statement supporting his charges. Id.
Further, the respondent repeated these charges during a citation deposition. Id.
77. Id. at 256, 261, 506 N.E.2d at 1300, 1303. Although the Hearing Board deter-
1988]
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Review Board, however, determined that a six-month suspension
was appropriate in light of the Hearing Board's findings of fact. 8
The Illinois Supreme Court held that censure was the appropri-
ate sanction. 79 Although the court stated that the intentional re-
cantation of sworn testimony in exchange for financial gain could
not be justified, the court noted that the respondent's misconduct
did not result in any "real harm.""0 Further, the court reasoned
that suspension was not necessary "either to safeguard the public
or maintain the integrity of the legal profession." 8'
In reaching this conclusion, the court placed great emphasis on
the respondent's impairment at the time of the recantation and his
successful rehabilitation.12 The court emphasized that evidence
linking one's impairment to his misconduct will be considered in
mitigation. 3 The court noted, however, that this evidence "will
not act as a bar to discipline."18 4 Additionally, the court held that a
''respondent's successful rehabilitation is relevant in determining
an appropriate sanction."8 5 Moreover, the court considered the re-
spondent's production of favorable character witnesses, and his un-
blemished career record. 6 In light of these factors, the court
concluded that the respondent's unprofessional conduct did not in-
dicate that he was an improper person to practice law.8 7 There-
fore, censure was imposed. 8
In In re Houdek, 'the respondent was found to have "commin-
gled and converted client funds, neglected a legal matter, and made
misrepresentations of fact to his client and to the Attorney Regis-
mined that the respondent intended to recant his prior sworn testimony, they reached no
conclusion concerning the involvement of fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or moral turpitude.
Id. at 260, 506 N.E.2d at 1302. The Hearing Board found instead that the respondent was
mentally and physically impaired when he recanted his testimony. Id. at 261, 506 N.E.2d
at 1303. The respondent was suffering from mental as well as physical problems. Id. at
258, 506 N.E.2d at 1301-02. The respondent's two daughters had been raped violently
and murdered in 1964. Id. at 256, 506 N.E.2d at 1301. This incident haunted the re-
spondent for years and eventually led to a severe psychotic depression. Id. at 256, 258,
506 N.E.2d at 1301-02.
78. Id. at 256, 506 N.E.2d at 1300-01.
79. Id. at 263, 506 N.E.2d at 1304.
80. Id. at 262, 506 N.E.2d at 1303.
81. Id. at 263, 506 N.E.2d at 1304.
82. Id. at 261-63, 506 N.E.2d at 1303.
83. Id. at 261, 506 N.E.2d at 1303.
84. Id. (quoting In re Crisel, 101 Ill. 2d 332, 334, 461 N.E.2d 994, 999 (1984)).
85. Id. at 263, 506 N.E.2d at 1304.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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tration and Disciplinary Commission." 89 The court held that the
respondent's behavior warranted suspension for a period of two
years and until further order of the court." The court based this
holding primarily upon the respondent's dishonest and deceitful
behavior during the judicial proceedings.9'
The respondent's initial misconduct involved the commingling
and conversion of a small amount of money in connection with the
representation of one client.92 In order to facilitate a real estate
closing, the respondent agreed to submit the necessary documents
on behalf of his client.93 Pursuant to this agreement, the client
gave the respondent a required forty-five dollar title registration
fee.94 Four months later, and after several assurances by the re-
spondent that the papers had been mailed, the client discovered
that nothing had been done in connection with these papers.95 In
response to the Commission's initial investigation, the respondent
insisted that he had mailed the documents in September.96 Based
on a finding that the respondent fabricated evidence presented in
support of his position, and because the allegations contained in
the Administrator's complaint concerning respondent's miscon-
duct were found to be true, the Hearing Board recommended that
the respondent be suspended for a period of two years.9 7 The Re-
view Board approved the Hearing Board's report.98 In a concur-
ring opinion, however, two members of the Review Board
recommended that the respondent be suspended for a two-year pe-
riod and until further order of the court.99 The court agreed with
the concurring members' recommendation."°
The court held that the respondent's behavior indicated an un-
willingness and inability to "conform his conduct to professional
standards."'' The court concluded that, although the respon-
89. Houdek, 113 Il1. 2d at 324, 497 N.E.2d at 1169.
90. Id. at 327, 497 N.E.2d at 1170.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 326, 497 N.E.2d at 1170.
93. Id. at 325, 497 N.E.2d at 1169.
94. Id.
95. Id. The client was forced to retain a second attorney, and incurred $347.50 in
additional fees and costs to register his title. Id.
96. Id. at 325-26, 497 N.E.2d at 1170. In support of his position, the respondent
attached a copy of the check he claimed to have sent. The respondent claimed to have
sent a check for $45.00 to the client for reimbursement. Id. at 326, 497 N.E.2d at 1170.
97. Id. at 324, 497 N.E.2d at 1169.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 324-25, 497 N.E.2d at 1169.
100. Id. at 327, 497 N.E.2d at 1170.
101. Id.
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dent's misrepresentations in dealing with both his client and the
Commission warranted a two-year suspension, his general disre-
gard for professional standards warranted suspension until further
order of the court.10 2
In In re Braner, the court imposed disbarment when the respon-
dent had violated Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. 03 The respondent was charged with violating Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by defrauding and de-
ceiving the Illinois Department of Public Aid and his client's men-
tally incompetent wife, Mrs. Booker. 104  In addition, the
respondent was charged with failing to disclose pertinent informa-
tion to the court during probate and domestic court proceedings, in
violation of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.' 5
These allegations arose in connection with the respondent's repre-
sentation of one client in two separate proceedings. 06
The respondent's representation of the client involved a dissolu-
tion of marriage proceeding and a claim for the payment of medi-
cal bills against the estate of the client's wife. 10 7 Although the
respondent knew that the Department of Public Aid had a claim
against Mrs. Booker's estate, he failed to provide the court with
this information. 1 8 Further, the respondent failed to inform the
department, Mrs. Booker, or the bank, as her conservator, of the
proceedings." 9 As a result, when the respondent's petition was
granted by the court, Mrs. Booker's estate was left with no as-
sets. 10 Similarly, in the divorce proceeding, the respondent
presented his case without informing the court of both previous
102. Id.
103. Braner, 115 Ill. 2d at 386-87, 395, 504 N.E.2d at 103, 106. Canon I of the Code
of Professional Responsibility regulates the maintenance of integrity and competence of
the legal profession and Canon 7 deals with client representation. CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rules 1-101 to 1-103, 7-101 to 7-110, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
I IOA, CANONS I and 7 (1985).
104. Braner, 115 Ill. 2d at 386-87, 504 N.E.2d at 103.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 386, 504 N.E.2d at 103.
107. Id. at 388, 504 N.E.2d at 103. Pursuant to Mr. Booker's claims, the respondent
filed a petition in probate court praying that his client receive both Mrs. Booker's interest
in the house as reimbursement for prior medical payments, and priority over any pending
public source claims. Id. Mrs. Booker sustained permanent brain damage in an automo-
bile accident in 1974. Id. at 387, 504 N.E.2d at 103. The accident left her mentally
incompetent, and she was confined to a nursing home. Id.
108. Id. at 388, 504 N.E.2d at 103.
109. Id. Respondent was a former trust officer at the Belleville National Savings
Bank. Id. at 387, 504 N.E.2d at 103. In this capacity, respondent was responsible for
handling Mrs. Booker's conservatorship. Id.
110. Id. at 388, 504 N.E.2d at 103.
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proceedings involving Mrs. Booker and Mrs. Booker's impaired
mental state."' In light of the evidence, the Hearing Board found
the respondent guilty of the alleged violations and recommended
disbarment." 2 The Review Board affirmed, and the respondent
filed exceptions to the Review Board's recommendation.'
The court affirmed the review board's recommendation."14 Spe-
cifically, the court concluded that the respondent's motive and in-
tent to defraud and deceive could be inferred from both the
respondent's conduct, and the circumstances under which such
conduct took place."II In arriving at this decision, the court noted
that "a lawyer's 'high vocation' is to inform correctly the court
upon the law and the facts of a case and to aid it in doing justice
and arriving at correct conclusions."' " 6 Finally, the court restated
that intentional fraud warrants disbarment absent evidence of ex-
tenuating circumstances.' 7
C. Misconduct Resulting from Incompetent
Representation of Clients
The Illinois Supreme Court decided two cases during the Survey
year involving the incompetent misrepresentation of clients."' In
each case, the attorney was suspended from the practice of law for
a period of two years." 9
In In re Guilford, the respondent was charged with making mis-
representations to a client, making false statements to the Admin-
istrator, and neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. 120 The
court found the respondent guilty of these charges, and imposed a
two-year suspension to maintain the integrity of the legal
profession. ' 2
The client in Guilford retained the respondent to pursue reme-
111. Id. at 389, 504 N.E.2d at 103-04. Mrs. Booker received nothing from the disso-
lution proceeding and was left without assets or anticipated income. Id. at 389, 504
N.E.2d at 104.
112. Id. at 387, 504 N.E.2d at 103.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 394, 504 N.E.2d at 106.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 392, 504 N.E.2d at 105 (quoting People v. Beattie, 137 11. 553, 574, 27
N.E.2d 1096, 1103 (1891)).
117. Id. at 394, 504 N.E.2d at 106.
118. In re Segall, 117 I1. 2d 1, 509 N.E.2d 988 (1987); In re Guilford, 115 111. 2d 495,
505 N.E.2d 342 (1987).
119. Segali, 117 Ill. 2d at 8, 509 N.E.2d at 991; Guilford, 115 I1. 2d at 506, 505
N.E.2d at 347.
120. Guilford, 115 111. 2d at 496, 505 N.E.2d at 342-43.
121. Id. at 506, 505 N.E.2d at 347.
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dies in connection with a back injury his client incurred at work. 22
Accordingly, the respondent was required to file a workers' com-
pensation claim. 23 When the client inquired about the status of
his case, the respondent assured him on numerous occasions that it
was "on file" and would be "coming up.' 24 After approximately
one year, and repeated attempts by the client to obtain the number
of the case from the respondent, the client discovered that the re-
spondent never filed a workers' compensation or personal injury
claim on his behalf. 25
The Hearing Board recommended a suspension for three years
and until further order of the court. 126 The Review Board affirmed
the findings of the Hearing Board and recommended a two-year
suspension. 127 The court concluded that the findings of the Hear-
ing and Review Board were supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence.' 28 In order to determine the appropriate sanction, however,
the court considered the respondent's prior misconduct. 29 Based
on the evidence and circumstances presented, and in light of the
respondent's prior misconduct, the court found a two-year suspen-
sion to be the proper sanction.' 30 Regarding the Hearing Board's
recommended sanction, the court specifically noted that suspen-
sion "until further order of the court" is reserved for attorneys who
122. Id. at 497, 505 N.E.2d at 343.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 498, 505 N.E.2d at 343.
125. Id. at 498, 500, 505 N.E.2d at 343-44. The client was told by the respondent
that the number was 80 WC 22682. Id. at 498, 505 N.E.2d at 343. The client later
discovered that file number 80 WC 22682 identified a case unrelated to Brandon's claim.
Id. at 498, 505 N.E.2d at 343-44. By the time Brandon discovered the absence of a filed
complaint, the two-year statute of limitations had lapsed, thus effectively barring any
potential personal injury action. Id. at 500, 505 N.E.2d at 344.
126. Id. at 497, 505 N.E.2d at 343. When an attorney is su4spended for a specified
period of time and until further order of the court, he is not reinstated automatically
when the period expires. Rather, the attorney must petition the court for reinstatement
pursuant to Rule 767. ILL. S. CT. R. 767, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 767 (1985).
See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
127. Guilford, 115 III. 2d at 497, 505 N.E.2d at 343.
128. Id. at 502, 505 N.E.2d at 345. Clear and convincing evidence is a standard of
proof requiring that no reasonable doubt remain in the mind of the trier of fact concern-
ing the truth of the matter at issue. In re Jones, 34 Ill. App. 3d 603, 340 N.E.2d 269
(1975).
129. Guilford, 115 III. 2d at 502, 505 N.E.2d at 345. In 1978, the respondent was
suspended for a period of six months for the neglect of the matters of two separate clients.
Id. at 502-03, 505 N.E.2d at 345-46. In 1982, the respondent was suspended for six weeks
after his failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum for the production of documents.
Id. at 503, 505 N.E.2d at 345-46. This suspension was later vacated when the respondent
produced the requested documents. Id.
130. Id. at 506, 505 N.E.2d at 347.
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suffer from mental illness, mental instability, or some form of
addiction. I3'
In re Segall involved an attorney's attempted settlement of law-
suits brought against him by certain creditors. 32 The court con-
cluded that these attempted settlements violated Rules 1-102
(a)(4), 1-104(a)(5), and 7-104(a)(1) of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.1 3  On two separate occasions, the respondent at-
tempted to settle delinquent credit accounts by sending the
company a letter that referenced the pending lawsuit and a check
for an amount substantially lower than his balance. 34 The letters
failed to state the amount the respondent actually owed, and the
checks included an endorsement restriction in an attempt to limit
the corporation's recovery. 35  In both instances, the respondent
knowingly bypassed the company's lawyers, and sent the letter and
check directly to the corporation.1 36
Though the respondent admitted that he "knowingly contacted
a party represented by counsel without obtaining counsel's con-
sent," the respondent maintained that he contacted these parties as
a litigant, and was, therefore, outside the parameters of Rule 7-
104(a)(1). 117 The court, however, disagreed. 38  The court stated
that when an attorney is a party to litigation, he represents himself
when he contacts opposing parties.'3 9 To conclude otherwise, the
court reasoned, would defeat the purpose of Rule 7-104(a)(1),
which serves to protect litigants represented by counsel from the
type of direct contact made by the respondent.' 4° Consequently,
131. Id. at 503, 505 N.E.2d at 346. During the Survey year, however, the supreme
court imposed a suspension "until further order of the court" based on a respondent's
general disregard for professional standards. In re Houdek, 113 I1. 2d 323, 497 N.E.2d
1169 (1986). See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
132. In re Segall, 117 111. 2d at 3, 509 N.E.2d at 988-89.
133. Id. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rules I-102(a)(4), 1-102(a)(5), 7-
104(a)(l), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, CANONS I and 7 (1985). For an explanation of
Rule 1-102(a)(4), see supra note 45. Rule I-102(a)(5) provides that an attorney may not
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rule 7-104(a)(1)
provides that during the course of a lawyers representation of a client, he may not "com-
municate on the subject of representation... with a party he knows to be represented by a
lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such
other party."
134. Segall, 117 II1. 2d at 3-5, 509 N.E.2d at 989.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6, 509 N.E.2d at 990.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the court held the respondent was in direct violation of the rule. 4'
Moreover, the court held that the respondent's general conduct
was fraudulent in nature. 42 In view of the respondent's attempted
fraud and his Rule 7-105(a)(1) violation, the court imposed a sus-
pension for two years. 43
V. ATTORNEY REINSTATEMENT
During the Survey year, the court addressed one case involving
attorney reinstatement to the bar.'44 In In re Carnow, the Illinois
Supreme Court restated that when considering an attorney's peti-
tion for reinstatement, it alone decides whether or not the petition
will be granted. 45
In re Carnow involved a disbarred attorney's petition for rein-
statement after the minimum waiting period imposed by Rule
767. 146 A hearing panel ruled that the petitioner's initial miscon-
duct had been too serious to permit reinstatement after the mini-
mum period. '4  The Review Board disagreed, however, finding
that the petitioner had met the requirements imposed by Rule
767.' 4s The Review Board unanimously recommended reinstate-
ment. '49 The petitioner's initial misconduct involved the payment
141. Id.
142. Id. at 8, 509 N.E.2d at 991. Specifically, the court held that the respondent's
behavior amounted to attempts to settle large claims for unusually small amounts. Id.
The court also concluded that by filing motions to dismiss the suits because of alleged
settlement, the respondent acted in a manner that was prejudicial to the administration of
justice in violation of Rule 1-102(a)(5). Id.
143. Id.
144. In re Carnow, 114 Ill. 2d 461, 501 N.E.2d 128 (1986). In order to initiate the
reinstatement process, an attorney must petition the court pursuant to Rule 767. ILL. S.
Cr. R. 767, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IOA, para. 767 (1985). Rule 767 lists six specific
factors that are to be considered by the court when determining whether a petitioner has
been rehabilitated. The six factors are as follows: (1) the nature of the petitioner's initial
misconduct; (2) the maturity and experience of the petitioner at the time the petitioner
was initially disbarred; (3) the level of petitioner's recognition of the nature and serious-
ness of the initial misconduct; (4) whether restitution has been made if required; (5) peti-
tioner's conduct since disbarment; and (6) the petitioner's straightforwardness and
honesty in presenting the evidence in support of his petition. According to the Illinois
Supreme Court, when evaluating a Rule 767 petition, the greatest emphasis should be
placed on the petitioner's rehabilitation and present character. ILL. S. CT. R. 767, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 767 (1985).
145. Carnow, 114 I11. 2d at 469, 501 N.E.2d at 131.
146. Id. at 464, 501 N.E.2d at 129. Rule 767(a) permits an attorney to petition for
reinstatement no less than five years after the entry of the order of disbarment. ILL. S.
CT. R. 767, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 767 (1985).
147. Carnow, 114 I11. 2d at 464, 501 N.E.2d at 129.
148. Id. at 465, 501 N.E.2d at 129.
149. Id.
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of twenty thousand dollars to a City of Chicago employee in con-
nection with a zoning variance desired by one of the petitioner's
clients.' The court held that although the petitioner's miscon-
duct had been extremely serious, his petition must be granted in
recognition of the uniformity of treatment principle. 5 1 The court
also noted that it had been more than seven years since the peti-
tioner's disbarment, and fourteen years since his offense.' 5 2 Fur-
ther, the court stated that the misconduct had occurred early in the
petitioner's career, and had been induced, in part, by economic and
physical threats. 5 3 Moreover, the court concluded that the peti-
tioner's conduct since his disbarment was exemplary. 154 Based on
these findings, the court concluded that the petitioner had success-
fully met his burden of proving his rehabilitation and present good
character. 55 A. ordingly, the court reinstated the petitioner to the
role of an attc ney licensed to practice law in Illinois.'56
VI. PROFESSIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE
The Illinois Appellate Courts addressed four cases involving
legal malpractice during the Survey year. 57 Attorney malpractice
actions, like attorney disciplinary proceedings, arise directly out of
the attorney-client relationship. Additionally, both malpractice ac-
tions and disciplinary proceedings involve the failure of an attor-
ney to adhere to certain minimum standards of conduct. 58 During
150. Id. Although the employee had no direct power with regard to zoning, the peti-
tioner made the payment to prevent the employee from interfering with the zoning re-
quest. Id.
151. Id. at 472, 501 N.E.2d at 132-33. In an effort to impose a uniform standard of
discipline, the court looked to the discipline deemed appropriate in similar circumstances.
Id. at 472-73, 501 N.E.2d at 133. See In re Williams, 111 111. 2d 105, 116, 488 N.E.2d
1017, 1023 (1986)(where respondent was convicted of mail fraud, the court relied on
cases with similar facts and circumstances when deciding the appropriate discipline); In
re Young, 111 111. 2d 98, 104, 488 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (1986)(where respondent commin-
gled and converted client funds, and censure was imposed in light of similar cases involv-
ing similar attorney misconduct). In Carnow, the court observed that in several cases,
attorneys who had engaged in misconduct of a similar nature had been reinstated by the
court. Carnow, 114 111. 2d at 472-73, 501 N.E.2d at 133.
152. Carnow, 114 Il. 2d at 473, 501 N.E.2d at 133.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Goldstein v. Lustig, 154 111. App. 3d 595, 507 N.E.2d 164 (1987); Coughlin v.
SeRine, 154 II1. App. 3d 510, 507 N.E.2d 505, appeal denied, 116 II!. 2d -, 515 N.E.2d
104 (1987); Claire Associates v. Pontikes, 151 I11. App. 3d 116, 502 N.E.2d 1186, appeal
denied, 114 Il1. 2d -, 508 N.E.2d 726 (1987); Shehade v. Gerson, 148 Ill. App. 3d 1026,
500 N.E.2d 510, appeal denied, - I1l. 2d -, 505 N.E.2d 352 (1987).
158. See, e.g., Coughlin, 154 Iii. App. 3d at 510, 507 N.E.2d at 505. In Coughlin, the
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the Survey year, the court restated that the ethical standards set
forth in the Canons of Ethics are relevant and proper considera-
tions in each area.'1 9 The court reasoned that to hold attorneys to
one set of professional standards in disciplinary proceedings, and
to some other set of standards in a tort action would be anoma-
lous.'6 Although the Code of Professional Responsibility is not
binding on the courts, the Canons of Ethics provide a professional
standard by which an attorney's conduct may be judged. 61 More-
over, the court stated that an attorney may be disciplined for not
observing these standards. 162
In Shehade v. Gerson, the plaintiff appealed from a trial court's
order dismissing two counts of her three-count malpractice com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action. 63 The plaintiff's com-
plaint against the defendant, her attorney, alleged that because the
attorney insufficiently protected her interests, she lost custody of
her son.T 6 Specific. _ly, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that her
attorney failed to obtain a court order barring her ex-husband from
unsupervised visitation of her son. 65 The plaintiff maintained that
this failure resulted in the kidnapping of her son. 66
In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court reiterated the elements necessary to state a sufficient legal
malpractice cause of action. 67 A plaintiff must allege a duty aris-
plaintiff filed a legal malpractice complaint alleging that the defendant engaged in unnec-
essary and unauthorized services and demanded a bonus absent an agreement during the
course of representation. Id. at 513-14, 507 N.E.2d at 508-09. The circuit court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Id. at 512, 507 N.E.2d at 507.
The appellate court, however, looking to the professional standards of ethics, found that
the defendant had breached his duty not to overcharge the plaintiff. Id. at 514, 507
N.E.2d at 509. The appellate court reversed the circuit court's finding on this count of the
plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 517, 507 N.E.2d at 510.
159. Id. at 514, 507 N.E.2d at 509.
160. Id.
161. Id. See, e.g., Rogers v. Robson, 74 11. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979)
aff'd, 81 111. 2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 47 (1980)(professional standards of ethics are relative
considerations in tort cases and represent the minimum standards by which an attorney's
conduct may be judged).
162. Coughlin, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 514, 501 N.E.2d at 509.
163. Shehade, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1027, 500 N.E.2d at 511. The matter before the
court arose from a trial court's order dismissing two counts of the plaintiff's three-count
complaint. Id. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision on count III, but
reversed on count II. Id. at 1032, 500 N.E.2d at 514. Malpractice complaints may be
dismissed under the authority of section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-615 (1985).
164. Shehade, 148 11. App. 3d at 1029, 500 N.E.2d at 512.
165. Id. at 1028, 500 N.E.2d at 511.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1029, 500 N.E.2d at 512.
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ing out of the attorney-client relationship, a breach of that duty, 168
a causal connection between the breach and the client's resulting
injury or loss, and resulting damages. 169
In Shehade, the appellate court found that all the necessary ele-
ments were evident from the face of the plaintiff's complaint ex-
cept proximate cause. 70 The court stated, however, that unless it
found as a matter of law that no set of facts could be proven that
would entitle the plaintiff to relief, and the plaintiff's attorney
could not have obtained the requested court order, the trial court's
findings would have to be reversed.' 7' Accordingly, because the
kidnapping of the plaintiff's child took place during the un-
supervised visitation that the plaintiff requested her attorney to
prevent, 72 proximate cause could be proven. 73 The court, there-
fore, reversed the judgment of the trial court on this count of the
plaintiff's complaint. 74
In Claire Associates v. Pontikes, 175 the court again addressed the
issue of the sufficiency of a legal malpractice complaint. 76 The
circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's initial complaint pursuant to
section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure177 because it failed to
state an actionable claim of malpractice.1 718 On appeal, this deter-
mination was upheld.
In Claire, the plaintiffs alleged that their attorneys' failed to re-
ply and appear on the plaintiffs' behalf in a breach of contract ac-
tion. '7 The plaintiffs further alleged that these failures resulted in
the dismissal of the plaintiffs' contract action with prejudice. 80
Moreover, after the dismissal of their case, the plaintiffs were mis-
led by their attorneys on several occasions about the status of their
case. 181
In addition to the required elements articulated in Shehade, the
168. Id. An act or omission on the part of an attorney may constitute a breach. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1028, 500 N.E.2d at 511-12. The plaintiff wanted to prevent periods of
unsupervised visitation between the child and his father. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1032, 500 N.E.2d at 514.
175. 151 Ill. App. 3d 116, 502 N.E.2d 1186.
176. Id. at 122, 502 N.E.2d at 1190.
177. Id. at 118, 502 N.E.2d at 1187. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
178. Claire, 151 Il1. App. 3d at 118, 502 N.E.2d at 1187.
179. Id. at 121, 502 N.E.2d at 1189.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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appellate court held that a valid underlying claim is necessary in
order to state a cause of action for legal malpractice. 8 2 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court reasoned that legal malpractice ac-
tions are dependent upon predicate lawsuits as a matter of law. s3
Further, the court explained that no malpractice can exist unless
the attorneys' negligence has resulted in the loss of either a valid
underlying cause of action or a meritorious defense. '84  Finally, the
court noted that, in light of the plaintiffs' burden of proof in attor-
ney malpractice actions, s5 plaintiffs are obliged to establish that
"but for" their attorney's negligence, the defense or prosecution of
the underlying suit would have been successful. 86 Upon examina-
tion, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs' underlying
complaint was deficient because the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy
the necessary "but for" requirement. 8 7 Accordingly, the judgment
of the circuit court was affirmed.' 8
In Goldstein v. Lustig,8 9 the plaintiff initiated a legal malpractice
action against the defendant, alleging that the defendant negli-
gently and carelessly misinterpreted and misadvised the plaintiff
about his employment contract.19' The circuit court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code
of Civil Procedure.' 9' On appeal, the circuit court's dismissal was
affirmed. 92
Specifically, the appellate court held that the plaintiff's com-
plaint did not state a cause of action because the plaintiff could
plead no set of facts that would establish the element of causa-
tion.' 93 Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the trial
182. Id. at 122, 502 N.E.2d at 1190.
183. Id.
184. Id. If a meritorious defense is lost, it is presumed that the attorney in question
was defending in the underlying suit.
185. Id. The court stated that a plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving
that damages resulted in a professional malpractice action. Id. at 122, N.E.2d at 1190
(citing Bartholomew v. Crockett, 131 I1l. App. 3d 456, 475 N.E.2d 1035 (1985)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 125, 502 N.E.2d at 1192.
188. Id.
189. 154 III. App. 3d 595, 507 N.E.2d 164.
190. Id. at 597, 507 N.E.2d at 166-67.
191. Id. at 596, 507 N.E.2d at 166.
192. Id. at 604, 507 N.E.2d at 171.
193. Id. at 599, 507 N.E.2d at 169. The plaintiff's underlying suit dealt with the
plaintiff's involvement in a fraudulent billing scheme in the course of his employment.
Id. at 597, 507 N.E.2d at 166. In affirming the circuit court's determination that the
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, the court noted that the plaintiff would not be
able to enforce his initial employment contract regardless of whether he resigned or was
terminated. Id. at 600, 507 N.E.2d at 168.
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court properly dismissed the complaint. 94
In addition to challenging the circuit court's ruling concerning
his failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff also alleged error
in the circuit court's characterization of the defendant's conduct. 195
The circuit court found that the defendant's erroneous advice to
the plaintiff was the result of an error in judgment rather than neg-
ligence. 96 The appellate court agreed, holding that the circuit
court had correctly construed the defendant's conduct. 97 The
court noted that in Illinois, an attorney is not liable to his clients
for errors in judgment. 198 Rather, attorneys are liable only for fail-
ing to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill. 199 The court
stated that this rule applies regardless of an unfavorable result to
the client.201 Accordingly, the circuit court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint was affirmed.20 '
VII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, Illinois courts stressed the importance
of moral fitness and adherence to ethical standards in the profes-
sional responsibility area. The courts' main concern was, and con-
tinues to be, the integrity of the legal profession and the safety of
the public. Further, the courts' objectives and considerations were
identical whether the matter involved a disciplinary proceeding, at-
torney reinstatement, or an action for legal malpractice.
In disciplinary matters, the Illinois Supreme Court focused pri-
marily on the attorney's ability to comply with certain minimum
standards of conduct as set forth in the Canons of Ethics.
Although mitigating factors are considered by the court when
making this determination, the court reiterated that mishandling of
client funds will result in sanctions even absent a dishonest motive.
In the area of attorney reinstatement, the court focused on reha-
bilitation. The court noted that a petitioner has the burden of
proving rehabilitation and present good character. Moreover, the
194. Id. at 599, 507 N.E.2d at 167.
195. Id. at 600, 507 N.E.2d at 168.
196. Id. at 600, 507 N.E.2d at 169.
197. Id.
198. Id. See e.g., York v. Stiefel, 109 11. App. 3d 342, 440 NE.2d 449 (3d Dist.
1982), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 99 11. 2d 312, 458 N.E.2d 488 (1983)(attorneys are not
obligated by law to serve as guarantors of their judgment or opinion).
199. Goldstein, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 600, 507 N.E.2d at 168-69.
200. Id. at 600, 507 N.E.2d at 169.
201. Id. at 604, 507 N.E.2d at 171.
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court restated that the Illinois Supreme Court alone decides
whether a petition for reinstatement will be granted.
Finally, in the area of professional legal malpractice, Illinois ap-
pellate courts held attorneys to the same ethical and moral stan-
dards imposed by the Illinois Supreme Court in disciplinary
proceedings. The courts reasoned that it would be anomalous to
impose some other sort of standards in tort actions. The opinions
during the Survey year suggest that careful consideration should be
given by members of the Illinois bar to the moral fitness necessary
for the practice of law.
